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the minor's character, the
his
adual age, and other relevant factors, that the said minor
not a fit
for consideration under the Juvenile
r~aw;

"IT Is HEREBY ORDERED that the said minor Gene Lawrence Dotson be remanded to the
Court in order
that criminal proceedings be instituted against him under
the General La1v and the aforesaid Indictment.''
As indicated
the order it must be assumed that the
court, in disposing of the matter, considered that
the defendant although a minor in years had been conducting
himself as an adult. It appears in the record that he was
had been moving about the country from job to
had enlisted and been discharged from the :VIarine Corps,
had a
record of criminal conviction and had served at
least one jail sentence.
On the lOth
of November the
proceedings
in the superior court were resumed and the defendant, repre,;ented
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offenses
in the indictment and the case was set for trial. Continuances were
on the 16th of November and on the
13th of December. Counsel for the defendant consented to
the eontinuance in each instanee. Trial was eommenced on
the lOth of
1955. At all stages of the trial the defendant vms represented
counsel. On February 2 the
defendant was found guilty in the first degree of each of
the three eounts. On appeal he assigns as error a claimed lack
of
counsel in the juvenile court that counsel
until shortly before trial in the superior
that certain conduct on the part of the district
resulted in an unfair trial.
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no atin any wrongscope of its
ascertained that the defendant was not
"fit
" for consideration in that
and declined
to exercise further
over him. The determination
of that
the sound discretion of the
""''"'LJ""'''" that a minor may
haYe such record
or his derelictions may be
such a character that to make him a ward of the
court v;-ould not aid him or serve the purposes of the court.
60 Cal.App.2d 463 [141 P.2d 37} ; 15
v.
Cal.Jur.2cl 631.) It appears from the order of the juvenile
that the
exercised his discretion with such considerations in mind, and in
so under the circumstances
here sh01vn the defendant was not
of any constitu\V e are aware of no authority which would deem
in the
court in this
instance to have been a
in the criminal proceedings or
to have resulted in a denial of clue process of law.
As to the claimed lack of
by
counsel in the
court the defendant states that about
4 :30 p. m. on
9,
an
from the public
defender's office advised him that he would
him;
that he talked with the attorney for approximately 15 minutes
at that time; that the felony murder doctrine was not men-
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146 C.2d 891; 299 P.2d 875

and that he flid not talk with counsel again until the
trial rommenrPd on the following morning. As previously
the record shows that the defenflant was
counsel from the public <lefNJder's offh·e at the
Nowmber 1,
at the second
on November
at the eontinuanec on the 16th of
at the continuance on the 1:1th of Derembcr, and at all other
of
the eriminal proeeedings. ·while the trial commenced on .Janafter the claimed initial
the
10, one
oprning statrments of eounsel and the questioning of witnesses
d not begin until ,January 13.
Thr defrndant doeR not rontend, aJH1 the record does not
show in any respret, that there iYas a 111'<'<1 for a confC'rrnPP
than that whieh is f'lai.med to have taken place that
n reqnrst was made for a longer or ad(litional conferenre by
Pithrr the rlPfendant or his eounsPl; that c-onsultation vvas in
any way limited by the eourt or by the defendant's counsel ;
that f'onns0l was not ade(]uatrly prrparPd for trial, or that
defendant was in any way prejudiced by not having ronl'Ultrd counsrl for a longrr period. On the othrr hand, a
rrview of the record affirmatively shows that the evidence of
drfrndant's guilt was so owrwhPlming that no adrquatr~
defPnse eonl<l havP hren int<>rposed; that his attorney eondnded the drfensc against thr eharg0s as wrll as eonld rrasonhave brrn rxpeeted, and that there is no evidence of a
laek of preparation or of insufficient time in whieh to prrparP.
ln this lattee rrgard it appPars that more than two months
elapsPd hchvrrn arraignment and trial during which timr thr>
pnblie defendrr was active in the ease and had available to
him the record of thr proppedings lwforr thr grand jur~'.
\Vhat further brncfit may have aeerued to the defendant by
!'ontinurd ronsultations with his attorney does not appear.
The easrs relied on by the defendant are all cases in whieh
defendant was shown to have bren prejudiced by an appointnwnt of eonm;cl in a manner or at a time which made adequaic
l'Ppresentation impossible (Powrll Y. Alabama, 287 n.s. 45
15:1 S.Ct. 55, 77 I1.Ed. 158. 84 A.LR 5271; People v. Chesser.
Cal.2d 815 [178 P.2d 761. 170 A.hH. 246]). or b:r thP
appointment of eounsp] who failPd to eondnct himRelf in the
best interesh; of the defendant (Pcop7c Y. Avilez, 86 Cal.
App.2d 289 fl 94 P.2d 829]), or b;' the affinnatiw denial of
the right to eonsu1t with or be rrpersrntrd by vonnsrl of the
defPndmJt'R own ehoirr at all sial!es of a l'riminal proceeding
46 C.2d-29
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The defendant's contention that the district attorney
of
misconduct is basea upon three "'"'"""'""'""
[8] It is contended first that it was misconduct to question the defendant ou cross-examination conbad cheek passing in the State of Oregon. The
defendant first raised this question when he testified on
r:xamination that he had passed a check in Oregon, and on
cross-examination the district attorney further pursued the
subject. Two of the questions asked concerning the number
of checks passed were not answered on the advice of the court,
and the district attorney succeeded in bringing out no information not testified to on direct examination.
[9] It is next contended that the district attorney improperly asked whether the defendant had received an undesirable
discharge from the Marine Corps. On direct examination the
defendant had testified that he had been a member of the
Marine Corps and had been discharged at the age of 17, and
on cross-examination the district attorney brought out that
the defendant had received a dishonorable discharge, later
f'nbstituted by a general discharge under honorable conditions.
[10] It is finally contended that the district attorney improperly brought to the jury's attention the fact that the
defendant had served time in jail. Again this was first
brought out on direct examination when the defendant testified
that he had served six months in a county jail in Oregon, and
denied having made statements that he had served time elsewhere. On cross-examination the district attorney obtained
no further admissions from the defendant.
[11] It is well established that the scope of proper crossexamination may extend to the whole transaction of which the
witness has testified, or it may be employed to elicit any
matter which may tend to overcome. qualify or explain the
testimony given by a witness on his direct examination.
(People v. W estek, 31 Cal.2d 469, 476 [190 P.2d 9] ; People v.
Tyren, 179 Cal. 575, 580 [178 P. 132].) The defendant has
failed to show that he was not adequately represented by
counsel at aU stages of the criminal proceedings; that any
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CAHTEH, ,J.~--1 dissent.
It is my
that the minor here involved was
due process of law lwnl\ISP of iadz of eonnsel ill the
rt proccediJJgs.
Dc>fendant was <W<·.used of a St'l'ious
; he was rPm<:wdt"d
the juvellile eouri h<'<·au:-w of his agt•. ! 11 the
only que::;tioll determi1wd, sa far as t!u: record
i:-;
wht•iher (Jl' not dPfenclant was a fit subjed. for the eonsidt"t'a
1ion of that r:ourt. Sine<~ he was mHloubtt:dly a minor, lH'
11as within thai eourt's jurisdietion if that court, in tltt•
(·xereise of it:.; diseretion, saw fit to retain it;; jurisdietion over
him. It eannot be denied that defendant futun~ would have·
lweu an entirely !liffeJ·,~ut matter had the juvenile eourt n··
laiued jurisdidion rather tlum
him tu the superio1·
<·ourt. fm trial on the felony dwrges. !f defl'ndant had bet•IJ
with eounsel at that time so that he eould havP
tlefeuded himself on the issue then iuvolved, it i:-; very probable
I hat the outr:ome would ha Ye been differellt. 'l'he California
'onstitutiou (art. I, § 18) provides that in eriminal prosec:nt ions "in any court whatever" the party accused shall haw
1he right to appear and defend in p('rson and with counsel.
t has been said, and. is said again here in the majority
opinion, that proceedings in the juvenile court are not <<l'illlinal in nature even though the charge is a erimina! oJJe. II
ppears to me that when the eharge is a criminal Ollll, alld
particularly when it is as SPrious as the one involn•d hen'.
the proeeedings should be c·onsidered eriminal in nature
am! the aecmsed be ac~eorded all the safeguards intended for
his protection. In In r-e Contreras, 109 CaLApp.2d 787, 789
1241 P.2d fi:31], it was said: '·While tht· juvenile eourt law
that adjutlieation of a mixwr to be a ward of the
eourt shall Hot lw deemed to bP a t•onvietiou of crime, uewrt heless, for all pradieal purpo,.;e:-;, this is a legal fietlon,
presenting a ehalleug-e to t~rednlity and doillg- violenc~t~ to
reason. Courts <·annot and ,dll not ,.;}mt tht·ir eyes and t·at·,.;
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to everyday contemporary happenings.'' It was also said
p. 790): "Surely, a minor charged in the juvenile
eonrt with acts denoune<•d by law as a felony does not have
lesser constitutional, statutory rights or guarantees than are
afforded an adult under similar circumstances in the superior
eourt. . . . In practically all of the eases affecting juvenile
court proceedings that have come to our attention, the minor
has admitted the charg·e lodged against him and the only problem presented to the court was hovv to best guide and control
the minor with a view to his rehabilitation and further development. In the case at bar however, the minor emphatieally and at all times denied his alleged delinquency. Under
such circumstances his liberty should not be taken from his
[sic] until his guilt of the charges judged against him was
established by legal evidence. That however praiseworthy,
aceording to the viewpoint of the individual, may be the
motives of the juvenile court, that tribunal may not impinge
upon the legal rights of one brought before it is emphatically
set forth in In re Tahbel, 46 Cal.App. 755, 760, 761, 762, 763
I 189 P. 804]; in In re Hill, supn~, pp. 26, 27, 28 [78 Cal.App.
23 (247 P. 591)] ; and in In re Rauch, 10:1 Ca1.App.2d 690, 698
I 230 P.2d 115]. In the jina.l analysis the j!lvenile court is a
judimal institution." (Emphasis added.) In In re Pojf,
n35 ]'.Supp. 224, 227, the Contreras case was approved, and
it was held that the l<"gislative intent was to enlarge, not to
diminish the constitutional protections afforded a minor. The
eonrt there conduded: ''I hold only that where a child commits an act, which aet if committed by <lll adult would constitute a crime, then due procetis in the Juvenile Court requires that the child be advised that he is entitled to the
effective assistance of counsel, and this is so even though the
,Juvenile Conrt in making dispositions of delinquent children
is not a criminal court. ''
In the majority opinion it is said that there is nothing in
the present record to show that the minor defendant here was
deprived of his rights or denied due process of law. When
the gravity of the charge is taken into eonsideration, it seems
to me that the lack of counsel to advise defendant was a
tleprivation of due process in the jnn~nile court proceedings
which nre judic.ial proceedings.
I would therefore reverse the judgment.
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